We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm's products. This weakens the firms' competition in the product market, and the resulting anti-competitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anti-competitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.
Introduction
Aftermarket services, such as repair and maintenance services, refer to services used together with durable equipment but purchased after the consumer has acquired the equipment. In this paper, we focus on aftermarket services that are required by a certain fraction of durable units after sales. Repair services are aftermarket services of this kind, given that durable goods often (but not always) break down and broken units require repair services for continued usage. One might feel that repair services are not an activity of much economic significance. This, however, is not at all the case. Eschenbach and Hoekman (2005) , for example, report that distribution and repair services account for about 10% to 20% of the stock of inward service Foreign Direct We analyze the provision of repair services in the context of international trade and explore its welfare consequences and policy implications. To perform repair services effectively, proximity between service providers and consumers is a critical element. In the context of international trade, this implies that foreign durable-goods producers have a disadvantage in performing repair services in the domestic country. Foreign producers can overcome this disadvantage by establishing local service facilities through FDIs, but FDI may be very costly due not only to direct investment costs but also to a variety of regulatory impediments. Foreign producers may therefore choose not to establish local service facilities, and their broken units may remain unrepaired as a consequence.
2 This is the context in which domestic durable goods producers often perform repair services for their foreign rivals' products, a practice often observed in reality. The repair services for competitors' products are provided "voluntarily" in the sense that they are conducted without 1 The demands for repairs have also been increasing. For instance, it is reported that the number of requests for repair which Panasonic receives is 130,000 in 1995 and 370,000 in 1999, and the Home Appliance Recycling Act (Japan) implemented in 2001 was expected to increase the demand for repair service (Nikkei Ecology, April, 2001 ). Canon receives 1,000,000 inquiries that are associated with repairs (Nikkei Joho Strategy, December, 2003).
Louis Vuitton Japan repaired 330,000 garments in 2006 (Nikkei Business, June 11, 2007) . 2 For example, although some imported infrared heaters had a problem and they were subject to a product recall in Japan, some foreign producers were not able to provide repair services for their own products in Japan.
Even though foreign producers perform repair services in their own countries, it involves significant inconvenience and costs for consumers to ship broken units back and forth between different countries.
the consent of the original producers. 3 We analyze the provision of repair services through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm (firm D) and a foreign firm (firm F ) produce differentiated products (good D Regulatory impediments such as the ones mentioned above would keep the costs for service FDI high. This is captured by a high fixed cost for firm F to establish service facilities, K F , in our model, where the liberalization of service FDI reduces K F and the liberalization of goods trade reduces the tariff rate.
We demonstrate that trade liberalization in goods may hurt domestic consumers, reduce imports and the profit of firm F , and lower world welfare, and that these negative effects are 3 For example, in Japan, Nidec Sankyo Service Engineering Corporation, which is a domestic subsidiary of the Japanese machine-tool company, Nidec Sankyo Corporation, is providing maintenance and repair services for competitors' products, including imported products. Two Japanese companies, Maruju Ironworks and Masuda
Ironworks, are providing maintenance and repairs of machines, dies, and molds produced by other companies. Fuji
Xerox provides maintenance and repair services for office equipment even if customers use the equipment of other firms. Several IT companies including IBM and Fujitsu provide repair services for competitors' network products.
NEC supports other companies' products.
turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. The main logic behind this result can be explained as follows. Suppose that initially both the tariff rate and firm F 's fixed costs K F are high. Under the high tariff rate, neither firm establishes service facilities in the equilibrium (the No Repair equilibrium). Because of the high tariff, the domestic country's imports of good F are small. Hence, the number of broken units of good F that requires repair is also small, implying that neither firm can recover the fixed cost by performing repair services for good F . Now suppose that the liberalization of the trade in goods gradually reduces the tariff rate. The reduction of the tariff rate eventually switches the equilibrium from the No Repair equilibrium to the Rivals' Repair equilibrium. When the tariff rate becomes sufficiently low, firm D can recover the fixed cost since there is sufficient demand for repairing good F , whereas firm F cannot recover the fixed cost K F , which is assumed to be high.
Once firm D establishes service facilities for repairing good F , firm D can earn profit not only from selling good D but also from performing repair services for good F . Then, an increase in the sales of good D reduces consumers' willingness to pay for good F , which in turn decreases firm D's profit from performing repair services for good F . Hence, firm D is less willing to increase the sales of good D in the Rival's Repair equilibrium than in the No Repair equilibrium, implying that competition between firms D and F in the product market is weaker in the Rival's Repair equilibrium than in the No Repair equilibrium. We call this effect the anti-competitive effect of the rival firm's provision of repair services.
We find that, because of the anti-competitive effect, the switch from the No Repair equilibrium to the Rival's Repair equilibrium hurts consumers and reduces world welfare, although it benefits firm D. Although the anti-competitive effect also works in favor of firm F , the switch from the No Repair equilibrium to the Rival's equilibrium hurts firm F . If repair services for good F are not provided, the consumer makes a precautionary purchase of good F because she anticipates that a fraction of the purchased units of good F will fail and remain unworkable. The rival's repairs eliminates this precautionary purchase of good F , which decreases firm F 's sales of good F . We call the effect the market-contraction effect of repair services. Since the negative impact of the market-contraction effect on firm F 's profit dominates the positive impact of the anti-competitive effect, the rival's repairs decreases the profit of firm F . The rival's repairs also have an effect that increases the consumer's willingness to pay for good F in the product market, which we call the valuation effect. However, the valuation effect does not increase the profit of firm F because firm D sets the repair price in the repair market so that it can fully capture the favorable effect of the valuation effect.
The negative effects of trade liberalization in goods just mentioned are turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. This is because the liberalization of service FDI reduces 
Contributions and relationship to the literature
There have been several studies that investigate the connection between international trade and service sectors. 4 However, to our best knowledge, the present paper and another paper of ours (Ishikawa, Morita, and Mukunoki, 2010) are the only studies that investigate the link between trade liberalization in goods and liberalization of FDI for services that are performed after production of goods ("post-production services"). Ishikawa, Morita, and Mukunoki (2010), henceforth IMM, have analyzed an international duopoly model in which post-production services (such as sales and distribution) must be performed for all units before sales of goods. The foreign firm has an option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival by paying royalties or providing those services by itself in the domestic market.
There is, however, another class of services that are required only for a certain fraction of units, rather than for all units, after sales of goods. Chen and Ross (1994 , 1999 analyze, in their contributions to the study of aftermarket monopolization, provision of aftermarket services of this kind. Chen and Ross (1994) consider a durable-goods monopolist who produces durable units that break down with a certain probability, where repaired units and unbroken units are perfect substitutes. It is assumed that the monopolist can commit to its repair price at the time of original purchase. They show that the durable-goods monopolist can effectively price discriminate between high-intensity users and low-intensity users by monopolizing the repair market. See Chen and Ross (1999) for a related analysis in which the primary market is competitive rather than monopolistic. Chen and Ross (1998) address the commitment problem faced by a durable-goods monopolist by focusing on an aftermarket for repair services of this kind. They show that the monopolist's inability to commit to its behavior in the aftermarket creates no efficiency loss and no reduction in the monopolist's overall profit, because all broken units are repaired in equilibrium whether or not the monopolist can commit. The present paper's contribution is complementary to IMM's contribution in the sense that these two papers analyze two different types of post-production services in international trade contexts. That is, the present paper analyzes the provision of post-production services that are required only for a certain fraction of units after sales of goods, whereas IMM analyzes the provision of post-production services that must be performed for all units before sales of goods.
This difference results in different effects of trade liberalization on the profit of the foreign firm.
Trade liberalization in goods necessarily benefits the foreign firm in IMM, whereas in the present paper, trade liberalization in goods may hurt the foreign firm and the negative effect is turned into a positive one if service FDI is also liberalized.
Since post-production services must be performed for all units before sales in IMM, the foreign firm either performs the services by undertaking service FDI or outsources them to the domestic firm. The foreign firm chooses outsourcing when the foreign firm's fixed costs for undertaking service FDI are high, and the domestic firm charges the price for performing the services for the foreign firm so that the foreign firm is indifferent between service outsourcing and service FDI. Then, since trade liberalization in goods increases the foreign firm's profit under service FDI, it also increases the foreign firm's profit under service outsourcing, implying that trade liberalization in goods necessarily benefit the foreign firm in IMM.
In contrast, post-production (repair) services are required only for a fraction of units after sales in the present paper's model, and it is consumers who decide whether or not to repair broken units. When the foreign firm's fixed costs for service FDI and the tariff rate are both high, no firms establish service facilities for the foreign firm's products, and hence broken units are left unrepaired in equilibrium. As the tariff rate decreases, the model exhibits a switch from
No Repair equilibrium to Rival's Repair equilibrium. In Rival's Repair equilibrium, the domestic firm can make profits not only by selling and repairing its own products but also by repairing the foreign firm's products, whereas the foreign firm's sole source of profit continues to be the sales of its own product. This disadvantage of the foreign firm caused by the switch of equilibrium ends up reducing the profit of the foreign firm, and the switch also hurts consumers and reduces world welfare as mentioned earlier.
The present paper and IMM together demonstrate the importance of the liberalization of service FDI by showing, for both of the two different types of post-production services, that repaired because the amount of broken units is fixed in the aftermarket. Even if the aftermarket is monopolized by a single firm, the monopolist would set the threshold price because the marginal revenue of repairs always exceeds the marginal cost of them. This means that the monopolist's inability to commit in the aftermarket does not generate any efficiency loss. For the same reason, the competition in the aftermarket does not directly lead to efficiency gains.
trade liberalization in goods may hurt domestic consumers and reduce world welfare, and that these negative effects are turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. Furthermore, the present paper shows that the negative effect of trade liberalization in goods on the foreign firm can also be turned into a positive one through liberalization of service FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally develops an international duopoly model of durable-goods producers and aftermarket services, and derives the equilibrium of the model. Section 3 investigates the effects of the liberalization of trade in goods, the liberalization of FDI for repair services, and their connection. Section 4 discuss the robustness of the results under alternative set-ups. Section 5 summarizes the paper and offers concluding remarks. The Appendix contains Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions.
The model and equilibrium
A domestic firm (firm D) and a foreign firm (firm F ) engage in Cournot competition in the domestic market by producing horizontally-differentiated products. 
Z, where d i and Z denote the consumption of good i and a numeráire good, respectively. De- In order to perform repair services for good i, service facilities for good i must be established in the domestic country. We suppose that firm D has already established its facilities to perform repair services for good D and provides a full warranty when it sells good D. Firm F can establish its own service facilities by incurring a fixed cost K F and provides a full warranty for good F .
Also, firm D can establish facilities for repairing good F by incurring a fixed cost K D and charges r to repair a broken unit of good F . The full-warranty assumption is for simplifying the analysis, and the main results of the paper (all Propositions and Lemmas) would remain unchanged in the 6 The main results of our paper would be preserved even if the firms engage in Bertrand competition. 7 To ensure that the marginal revenue of each firm is decreasing in its sales, we also assume In stage 2, the two firms produce and supply the goods to the domestic market and the domestic consumers purchase them. The two firms have an identical marginal cost of production, which is denoted by c. The domestic government levies a non-negative, specific tariff, t, on the imports of good F . denote the amount of repaired broken units of good F . Due to the economies of scope between the repair services and the production activities, each firm has a cost advantage over its rival in the repairs of its own product. Specifically, the marginal cost of repairing its own product, m L , is no higher than the cost of repairing the rival's product, m H . We assume m L ≤ m H ≤ c holds so that the costs of repairs are no higher than the production cost. We also assume the producers' cost advantages in aftermarket services are large enough to exclude the entries of Independent Service Organizations (ISOs).
9
The operating profits of each firm (i.e., the profits gross of the fixed costs of establishing 8 By regarding t as the degree of cost disadvantages of the foreign firm, we can interpret the situation as if the two firms are heterogenous in the production cost. The main results of this paper would be mostly unchanged with this alternative set-up. However, the welfare property of the model needs to be slightly modified because the higher cost of the foreign firm no longer works as a transfer from the foreign country to the domestic country as the tariff does. 9 The main results of the paper would be unchanged even if we assume the producers of goods can exploit the 
Repair services and product-market competition
Here, we analyze the market equilibrium given the firms' decisions made in stage 1. We should first mention that all broken units of good F are repaired by firm F in equilibrium if firm F undertakes service FDI, even if firm D also establishes service facilities for repairing good F .
Suppose both firms have established service facilities for good F . Since firm F provides a full warranty for good F , firm D cannot attract consumers in stage 3 unless the service price is negative, r < 0. Since the marginal cost of providing services is positive, firm D has no incentives to set a negative price for repairing good F .
Firm F , which undertook service FDI, on the other hand, always has an incentive to provide a full warranty when it sells good F . While a full warranty generates negative profits in the aftermarket, it increases firm F 's profits in the product market because it increases the consumer's willingness to pay for good F in the product market and so does the price of good F that firm F can charge. As long as firm F provides the repair services for good F , the loss in the aftermarket coincides with the gain in the product market, and the full warranty has no effect on firm F 's overall profits. As we will see below, firm D's repairs of good F hurts firm F . Therefore, firm F is willing to use the full warranty as a strong tool to force firm D out of the aftermarket for good F . 
The RR equilibrium
First, let us consider the RR subgame. In stage 3, each consumer maximizes
x F , which determines the demand for repairs regard-
holds, the consumer orders firm D to repair all broken units. If
holds, on the other hand, a certain fraction of the broken units remains unrepaired. In this case, the inverse demand for repairs is given by r = V F (x D , qx F + R F ). Since V F F < 0 holds, the demand for repairs is decreasing in the repair price for R F ∈ (0, (1 − q)x F ).
Given the demand for repairs, firm D determines r so that it maximizes the profit from providing the repair services for good F . Firm D's maximization problem is written by:
Let r denote the solution to this maximization problem. Then, the equilibrium amount of repaired
In stage 2, the consumer maximizes 
. Given these demand functions, the two firms respectively maximize
x D and x F . The two firms' profit maximization constitutes the equilibrium sales of each good.
The equilibrium sales in turn determine the equilibrium amount of repaired units, R F , and the equilibrium repair price, r. We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Even if the repair services for good F are provided by firm D, all broken units of the good are repaired in equilibrium.
An intuitive explanation is as follows. F 's unit cost of selling good F . Besides that, the "quality" of a repaired unit of good F is higher than that of the purchased unit of good F in the sense that the latter can break down after the purchase. This means that consumers' willingness to pay for an extra unit of good F is higher for the repaired unit than for the originally-purchased unit. Therefore, if evaluated at R F = 0, firm D's marginal revenue from repairing an extra unit is higher than firm F 's marginal revenue from selling an extra unit of good F . Because of these properties, the marginal revenue of firm D from repairing an extra unit of good F is always larger than the marginal cost.
Meanwhile, firm D anticipates that its repairs of good F in stage 3 increase the attractiveness of good F in the product market and thereby decrease its profits from selling good D in stage 11 This equilibrium property is the same as that of , though the logic behind our model is slightly different because the rival producer, rather than the original producer, provides the repair services.
2. However, we find that the positive effect of repairs on profits in the aftermarket always dominates the negative effect in the product market. Furthermore, it is not profitable for firm F to manipulate x F so that it prevents the full repairs of good F by firm D. Consequently, all broken units of good F are repaired in the RR equilibrium.
Since R F = (1 − q)x F holds, the equilibrium service price is given by r = V F (x D , x F ). Then, the first-order conditions of the firms' profit maximizations, ∂Π D /∂x D = 0 and ∂Π F /∂x F = 0, can be written as:
The equilibrium sales, (
, are derived by solving the above two equations and the equilibrium prices of the two goods and the equilibrium repair price are respectively given by
The OR equilibrium
Suppose firm F undertakes FDI in services to provide the repair services for good F by itself and gives a full warranty to each buyer of good F . In stage 2, the consumer anticipates that all broken units of good F are repaired for free in stage 3. This means that
holds, and the consumer maximizes
The first-order condition yields the inverse demand function for each good as
The two firms' problems become:
Then, the first-order conditions are given by:
The equilibrium sales are derived by solving (4) and (5) 
The NR equilibrium
Suppose neither firm D nor firm F establishes the repair facilities for good F in stage 1. In this case, all broken units of good F remain unrepaired (R F = 0), which means that d F = qx F holds. 12 In Stage 2, the consumer maximizes
The first-order condition yields the inverse demand function for each good, which is respectively given
Given these inverse demand functions, the firms' maximization problems are given by:
The first-order conditions of profit maximizations are as follows:
By solving these equations, we obtain the equilibrium sales of goods, which are denoted by
The equilibrium prices are respectively given by p
The effects of repair services
Here, we explore the effects of repair services for good F on product-market competition by comparing the three subgame equilibria just mentioned. The comparisons are essential for understanding the effects of trade liberalization in goods discussed in the next section, because a shift of the regime in the aftermarket, which is induced by trade liberalization, is an important factor to distinguish between welfare-reducing trade liberalization and welfare-improving trade liberalization.
We first examine how the repair services change the demand for good F in the product market, holding x D constant. Then, we discuss how they change the strategic interaction between the two firms.
Market-contraction effect and valuation effect
In the NR subgame, if the consumer were to consume d F of good F , she must purchase d F /q units in the product market because a fraction of good F fails and remains unrepaired. When d F /q units of good F are sold, the corresponding market price is given by Figure 1 ). The RN curve in Figure 1 represents the relationship between the price and the sales of good F in the NR subgame, holding x D constant. 12 The outcomes of the NR equilibrium would be unchanged even if we allow the repurchase of good F or the refund by firm F after consumers find the broken units. See Section 4.3 for details.
[ Figure 1 around here]
In the OR subgame, the consumption of good F , d F , coincides with the sales of good F because firm F repairs good F without charge. In this case, the price of good F is given by Figure 1 ). Holding x D constant, the relationship between the price and the sales of good F in the OR subgame is depicted as the OR curve in Figure 1 .
Starting from no repairs for good F , the repair services by firm F shift the demand for good F from the RN curve to the OR curve. Accordingly, given that the consumption of good F is d F , the price and the sales of good F move from point A to point C in Figure 1 . To decompose the movement into two effects, let point B in Figure 1 be the intersection of d F and qV
As is mentioned above, the consumer makes a precautionary purchase of good F in the NR subgame because she anticipates that a fraction of the purchased units of good F will fail and remain unworkable. Given d F and the price of good F , the amount of the extra purchase of good
The increased durability of good F with repair services for good F eliminates this precautionary purchase of good F . From the viewpoint of firm F , this means that its sales of good F decrease. We call the effect the market-contraction effect of repair services. In Figure 1 , the movement from point A to point B represents the market-contraction effect.
The increased durability of good F also raises the attractiveness of good F for the consumer and her willingness to pay for the good. Therefore, repair services increase the price of good F
We call this effect the valuation effect. The difference in the price,
, captures the valuation effect. In Figure 1 , the movement from point B to point C corresponds to the valuation effect.
The valuation effect increases the price that can be charged while the market-contraction effect decreases the amount of sales to achieve d F . Although the overall effect on the total revenue and the profit captured by firm F seems to be ambiguous, we can easily verify that the shift from the NR subgame to the OR subgame does not change the total revenue (and so the total expenditure of consumers), while it always increases the profit of firm F if x D and d F are kept constant.
"Business stealing" by the rival firm
Next, we consider the effect of the shift from the OR subgame to the RR subgame on the price and the sales of good F . In the OR subgame, firm F repairs good F and it captures the benefit from the valuation effect in the product market. If firm D repairs good F , however, the benefit from the valuation effect is captured by firm D in the aftermarket. In the RR subgame, each consumer anticipates at the time of purchasing good F that she will pay (1 − q) rx F in the aftermarket.
Given that the consumption of good F is d F , the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for good
in stage 3, the price of good F in the product market becomes
The expected price of repair services in the aftermarket makes the price of good F in the product market lower than the price of good F in the OR subgame,
Note that the expected repair price,
, coincides with the magnitudes of the valuation effect. This means that the benefit from the valuation effect is completely stolen by firm D. As a result, the price of good F declines from point C to point B in Figure 1, given d F . The RR curve, which is shifted downward from the OR curve by the same amount as the valuation effect, represents the relationship between the price and the sales of good F in the product market in the RR subgame.
It is apparent that, holding x D and d F constant, the shift from the OR subgame to the RR subgame reduces both the total revenue and the profit captured by firm F , while it does not change the total expenditure of consumers.
Up to this point, we have investigated the demands for good F in each subgame holding x D constant. In the equilibrium analysis, however, firm D strategically chooses x D in each subgame.
If we consider changes in x D , there emerges an anti-competitive effect in the RR subgame.
The detailed explanation will be made in the following subsection, which discusses the strategic interaction between the two firms.
Interaction between firms and anti-competitive effect
Bearing the above-mentioned effects in mind, now we compare the equilibrium outcomes when taking into account the changes in firm D's incentives and the strategic interactions between the two firms. As mentioned earlier, only the workable units of each good are substitutes for consumers. Therefore, the product-market competition in the NR subgame can be regarded as being if the two firms compete in x D and qx F . Firm D's reaction curve is derived from (6) and it is depicted as the dd line in Figure 2 . Similarly, firm F 's reaction curve is derived from (7) (7)). Therefore, the f f line also represents firm F 's reaction curve in the RR subgame. hold in equilibrium. Note that if the anti-competitive effect were absent, the repair services by firm D would have no effect on the equilibrium amount of workable units. Also, note that even if the amount of the workable units of good F remains unchanged, the market contraction effect of repair services makes the amount of the sales of good F decline. We can confirm that, although the anti-competitive effect makes the workable units of good F larger, the market-contraction effect dominates it and the equilibrium sales of good F actually decline in equilibrium:
Next, we discuss how the shift from the NR subgame to the OR subgame changes the equilibrium amount. In both subgames, firm D cannot capture any rents from the repair services of good F . Therefore, firm D's reaction function in the OR subgame becomes the same as that in the NR subgame, which has been depicted as the dd curve in Figure 3 .
[Figure 3 around here]
Firm F 's reaction function, on the other hand, changes because now firm F can capture the rents from the valuation effect of repair services. Firm F 's reaction curve, which is derived from (5) , is depicted as the F F line in Figure 3 . Although the unit cost of supplying good F is also increased from c + t to c + t + (1 − q)m L , we can confirm that an increase in the marginal revenue due to the valuation effect always dominates the increase in the unit cost. Therefore, the F F are ambiguous and they depend on the relative magnitudes of the valuation effect in the OR subgame and the anti-competitive effect in the RR subgame. In sum, we have the following proposition as to the equilibrium amount of the working units and the equilibrium amount of the sales of the two goods.
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Proposition 1 Given the tariff level, (i) qx
This proposition implies that the repair services for good F always: (i) increase the equilibrium workable units of good F , (ii) decrease the equilibrium sales as well as the equilibrium workable units of good D, and (iii) decrease the equilibrium sales of good F if firm D provides the repair services.
Consumer surplus and firms' profits
Having analyzed the effects of repair services on the equilibrium sales and the equilibrium workable units, we now turn to the effects on consumers and the firms. Let CS k denote the consumer surplus in the k (k ∈ {RR, OR, N R}) equilibrium. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given the tariff level, CS RR < CS NR < CS OR holds.
Compared to the NR subgame, the valuation effect increases firm F 's marginal gains from selling a workable unit of good F in the OR subgame. Therefore, the product-market competition becomes more intense in the OR subgame and consumers prefer the OR equilibrium to the NR equilibrium.
In contrast, the anti-competitive effect generated by the rival's repairs weakens the product market competition in the RR subgame. This effect raises the equilibrium price of good D, while it also increases the equilibrium workable units of good F . The latter positive effect, however, is relatively small because it is a second-order effect and an import tariff makes the market size of good F be weakly smaller than that of good D. Therefore, the former negative effect dominates the latter positive effect and consumers prefer the NR equilibrium to the RR equilibrium.
Even if consumers ex-ante anticipate that the repairs of imports by the domestic rival firm cause the anti-competitive effect, which increases the price of good D and eventually hurts them, 13 To make the proof of the following propositions as simple as possible, we use a standard quadratic form as the sub-utility function from here on: If we move from the NR equilibrium to the RR equilibrium, the rent from the valuation effect is captured by firm D, and only the market-contraction effect matters for firm F , which has a negative effect on the profit of firm F by reducing the sales of good F without affecting the workable units of good F . Although the anti-competitive effect works in favor of firm F , it is a second-order effect and is dominated by the market-contraction effect. By contrast, the market- 
Entry into the market for repair services of good F
To derive the equilibrium of the entire game, we examine the firms' entry decisions in stage 1.
The two firms simultaneously decide whether they provide the repair services for good F by A tariff reduction increases the imports of good F . This increases the amount of the broken units of good F , making it more attractive for firm D to earn profits from repairing the rival's product. The lemma means that, as long as are not provided in equilibrium when both t and K F are high (the region "NR" in Figure 4 ).
When K F is high while t is low, it becomes profitable for firm D to provide repair services for good F , and the aftermarket for good F is monopolized by firm D (the region "RR"). When both K F and t are low, however, ΔΠ F > K F holds and firm F can increase its overall profit by establishing service facilities and selling its product with a full warranty. The full warranty ensures that firm D never establishes service facilities whenever firm D anticipates that firm F 14 Lemma 2 implies that ΔΠ D is maximized at t = 0. Let t denote the minimum level of tariff that eliminates the imports of good F under the RR equilibrium and the NR equilibrium. Clearly, ΔΠ D = 0 holds if t = t. that firm F has a stronger incentive to undertake a service FDI if it faces a potential entry of the rival firm. 16 It is ambiguous whether ΔΠ F is decreasing or if there is an inverse-U shaped curve in t. The increased imports from a tariff reduction increase firm F 's gains from the entry, but there is an additional effect. In the RR subgame and the NR subgame, because firm F cannot capture the rents associated with the broken units, the demand curves are flatter than those in the OR case (see Figure 1) . Hence, the tariff reduction increases x F less in the OR subgame than it does in the RR and the NR subgames. If the cost of providing services (m L ) is sufficiently large and that of supplying the goods (c and t) is sufficiently small, the latter effect dominates the former effect and trade liberalization undermines firm F 's entry. See the Appendix for details. In Figure 4 , we depict the case where ΔΠ F is an inverse-U shaped curve in t. The shape of ΔΠ F does not affect the main results of the paper.
will establish service facilities. 17 Therefore, the repairs for good F are provided by firm F in equilibrium if ΔΠ F > K F holds (the region "OR").
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Liberalization of goods trade and service FDI
In this section, we examine the welfare effects of trade liberalization in goods and their connection to the structure of the aftermarket service. Trade liberalization, represented by a decline in t, affects welfare within each regime of the aftermarket services, and it may also affect welfare by inducing a switch of the regime. 18 Here, we will show that the overall effects of trade liberalization drastically differ depending on the extent to which service FDI is liberalized.
To describe the different effects of trade liberalization, we first compare these two specific cases: (i) the fixed cost of service FDI is high enough so that trade liberalization induces firm D's entry, (ii) the fixed cost of service FDI is low enough so that trade liberalization induces firm F 's entry. Then, we explain a general property of lowering the fixed cost.
Trade liberalization when the fixed cost of service FDI is high
Let K 0 F and t 0 respectively denote the initial level of the fixed costs for FDI in services and the initial level of the tariff. Suppose ΔΠ F < K 0 F and t 0 > t D hold so that entry into the repair services market for good F is unprofitable for both firm D and firm F . In this case, the equilibrium of the entire game is initially the NR equilibrium (see Point A in Figure 4 ). Starting from t 0 , if the tariff is gradually reduced, we have the following welfare effect within the NR equilibrium.
Within the NR equilibrium, trade liberalization has standard effects that increase the imports, benefit consumers and firm F , and hurt firm D. However, trade liberalization may worsen world welfare because the "quality" of good F is inferior to that of good D. The quality of good F is inferior in the sense that a fraction of good F fails and remains unrepaired. Trade liberalization has a substitution effect, which increases the consumption of good F and decreases that of good D, and the effect reduces consumers' gains from trade liberalization. As a result, firm D's profit loss can outweigh the consumers' gains. As the tariff is reduced, the imports of good F increase and the gains from entry into the service market for good F become larger. When 17 The entry decisions of the two firms do not depend on the full-warranty assumption. See Section 4.2 for details.
18 See the Appendix for the detailed calculations of the effects of trade liberalization within each regime.
the tariff reaches t = t D , the further reduction of t induces entry of firm D and switches the equilibrium from the NR equilibrium to the RR equilibrium. The switch to the RR equilibrium causes the anti-competitive effect, which reduces the extent of the product-market competition and discontinuously hurts consumers (see Proposition 2).
By using Propositions 1 and 3, we can also confirm that the switch discontinuously reduces the imports, hurts consumers and firm F , but does not affect firm D. The loss experienced by firm F is due to the market-contraction effect which outweighs the anti-competitive effect. The switch has no effect on firm D's net profit (i.e., the operating profits minus the fixed cost of FDI)
As a result, the negative effects of the equilibrium shift on consumer surplus (CS RR < CS NR ), Due to these effects, trade liberalization may worsen world welfare within the RR equilibrium. 
Trade liberalization when the fixed cost of service FDI is low
Next, suppose the fixed cost is reduced from K Figure 4 ). In this case, there exists a unique threshold value of tariff, t F (∈ (t D , t)), such that ΔΠ F > K F holds if and only if t < t F . As the tariff is reduced from t 0 and becomes lower than t = t F , it becomes profitable for firm F to undertake service FDI.
Because firm F offers a full warranty on good F at the point of selling good F , firm D has no way to win the competition with firm F in the aftermarket, and the RR equilibrium is no longer a possible equilibrium outcome for any t ∈ [0, t D ).
19 Consequently, the trade liberalization shifts the equilibrium from the NR to the OR equilibrium.
By using Propositions 2 and 3, we can confirm that the switch intensifies market competition and discontinuously benefits consumers, hurts firm D, and improves world welfare. 20 It does not affect firm F because ΔΠ F = K F holds at t = t F in this case. Once the service FDI is undertaken, the further trade liberalization within the OR equilibrium always has a standard effect that increases imports, benefits consumers and firm F , hurts firm D, and improves world welfare. Table 2 summarizes the effects of trade liberalization in this case.
[Insert Table 2 F is small enough to make t 0 ≤ t F hold, the equilibrium regime before the tariff reduction also becomes the OR equilibrium and any tariff reductions always have a positive effect on world welfare.
The role of liberalization in service FDI
The above two examples imply that consumer-hurting, welfare-reducing trade liberalization can be transformed into a consumer-benefiting, welfare-improving liberalization by liberalizing FDI in aftermarket services. This transformation is not a special case and has a general validity, as the following proposition states. The result suggests that promoting FDI in aftermarket services is important to make trade liberalization in goods consumer-benefiting and welfare-improving.
Proposition 5 If t D > 0 and K
0 F > ΔΠ F hold for some t in t ∈ [0, t D ),
Discussion
We have shown that the provision of aftermarket services conducted by the other firm, with which the original producer competes in the product market, has an anti-competitive effect and hurts consumers and worsens world welfare. It also hurts the original producer because the service provision reduces a pre-cautionary purchase of the good and this effect outweighs the anti-competitive effect. The liberalization of service FDI, however, converts the same trade liberalization into a consumer-benefiting, welfare-improving liberalization which also benefits the foreign firm. In this section, we explore the robustness of these results by relaxing some assumptions made in the basic model.
Repair services by ISOs
Up to this point, we have assumed that only firm D and firm F can provide the repair services. In this section, we consider the case in ISOs may also provide the repair services for good F . Under this alternative set-up, many potential ISOs, firm F , and firm D simultaneously decide whether they provide the repair services for good F in stage 1. If an ISO enters the repair market, it must incur the fixed cost. For simplicity, we assume the ISO incurs the same unit cost, m H , and the same fixed cost, K D , as firm D. 21 We can confirm that, even if ISOs enter the repair market, all broken units of good F are repaired in equilibrium. Given that a single ISO monopolizes the provision of repair services for good F , it sets r = V F (x D , x F ) to maximize its profit and the inverse demand for good F is given by
The equilibrium operating profit of the ISO is given by
Because firm F cannot capture the rents associated with the repairs, its maximization problem becomes the same as the RR subgame. Meanwhile, firm D cannot capture any rents from the repair services for good F either, and so its maximization problem is the same as that in the We have compared the NR equilibrium and the ISO equilibrium given the tariff level. Now we examine the effect of trade liberalization in the presence of ISOs. We can confirm that a tariff reduction increases an ISO's gains from providing the repair services (i.e, ∂{ΔΠ ISO }/∂t < 0).
The following proposition suggests that the ISO equilibrium can be the equilibrium of the entire game.
then there exists a threshold value of tariff, t ISO ∈ (0, t), such that the equilibrium of the entry game becomes: (i) the NR equilibrium if max[t ISO , t D ] ≤ t holds, (ii) the RR equilibrium if t ISO ≤ t < t D holds, (iii) the ISO equilibrium if t D ≤ t < t ISO holds, and (iii) either the ISO equilibrium or the RR equilibrium if 0 ≤ t < min[t ISO , t D ] holds.
When the tariff level is high, the import of good F is small and the ISO's operating profit from providing repair services does not exceed the fixed cost, K D . If the tariff is sufficiently reduced, however, the market size for repair services become sufficiently large and it becomes profitable for an ISO to enter the aftermarket if both firms or other ISOs do not enter. may hurt firm F and worsens world welfare, while it always benefits consumers and hurts firm
D.
In this situation, if the fixed cost of service FDI is sufficiently reduced, the same tariff reduction induces service FDI by firm F and becomes consumer-benefiting and welfare-improving.
These results suggest that even if the presence of ISOs prevents the repairs by the rival firm, trade liberalization could still worsen world welfare and the liberalization of service FDI is still important to guarantee welfare-improving trade liberalization.
Full-warranty assumption
We have assumed that firm D and firm F provide a full warranty if they provide the repair services for their own products. In this subsection, we show that our main results remain unchanged if they cannot provide a full warranty.
Consider a variant of the model in which firm i (i ∈ {D, F }) cannot provide a full warranty for its own product, and instead charges consumers a fee for repairing good i. Let s i denote the price that firm i sets for repairing good i in stage 3. Consider a subgame in which only firm F establishes the facilities for repairing good F in stage 1 (the OR subgame). It sets s F in stage 3 such that it maximizes the profit from the repair services. In stage 2, each consumer anticipates that she will pay s F in stage 3 per unit of repairs if the purchased unit is defective.
The prospect of paying the repair price diminishes each consumer's willingness to pay in the product market. Then, firm F maximizes its profits with respect to x F , anticipating that its decision in the product market affects the profit from the repair services in stage 3.
In the equilibrium of the OR subgame, firm F always sets s F such that all broken units, 
which is independent of s F and exactly the same as firm F 's maximization problem in the OR subgame of the base model (see Eq. (5)). In other words, the "full price" of good F that each consumer pays and firm F receives, p F + (1 − q)s F , becomes the same as the price of good F under the full-warranty assumption. Similarly, the "full price" of good D is unaffected by the absence of the full warranty. We have assumed that firm F does not repair good D after it undertakes FDI. Even if firm F could repair good D by incurring a fixed cost in stage 1, it would not do that because the firm cannot earn positive profit in the aftermarket of good D for the same reason as described above.
Repurchase of good F
Here, we consider the case where each consumer is able to repurchase good F from firm F if she found the unit of good F she purchased is broken down and the repair services for good F are not provided. We can show that the equilibrium outcomes in this situation coincide with those under the NR equilibrium (see Appendix for details). If consumers can repurchase good F under no repair services, ceteris paribus, they reduce the amount of the original purchase of good F because they no longer need to make a precautionary purchase. However, the reduction in the original purchase of good F coincides with the amount of good F consumers repurchase in equilibrium. In other words, the precautionary purchase of good F in the NR subgame fully supplements the repurchase of good F . Therefore, the qualitative nature of the results would remain unchanged even if we allow the repurchase of good F . 25 Furthermore, if the imported good is sold as a limited version with special specifications, the repurchase of the good is impossible.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the provision of repair services in an international duopoly model with differen- There are several directions in which our analysis can be extended. Our results indicate that a tariff-jumping FDI in production may make consumers worse off by inviting the domestic firm's entry into the aftermarket. To guarantee consumers' benefits of a tariff-jumping FDI, it should be accompanied by FDI in repair services. Considering the problem of parallel imports in our framework would be an interesting extension since the original producers sometimes refuse to repair the broken units sold by unauthorized distributors.
The profit-maximization problems of firm D and firm F are respectively given by:
By solving the first-order conditions, the optimal sales of the two firms, (x RR D , x RR F ), must satisfy:
By (A1), (A3), and c ≥ m H ,
actually constitute an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose λ = 0. This means that firm D sets R F so that only a part of the broken units
holds. Since we have assumed that
Combining this property with (A3) and c ≥ m H , we have:
This inequality contradicts (A4). Therefore, λ = 0 cannot hold in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
By solving (2) and (3), we have the equilibrium sales in the RR case as:
To guarantee x
By solving (4) and (5), we have the equilibrium sales in the OR case as: (4) and (5), and using (A5) and (A6), the equilibrium sales in the NR case are given by
By (A9), it is obvious that x
hold. By (A5) and (A6), and (A9), we
Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium consumer surplus under the quadratic utility function in the k (k ∈ {RR, OR, N R})
case is given by:
Since all broken units of good F are repaired both in the RR case and in the OR case, d hold because the broken units of good F remain unrepaired. We have:
We can verify that ∂B 3 /∂a > 0 holds. Hence, we have 
where
Proof of Proposition 3
Under the quadratic utility function, the operating profit of firm D in each equilibrium is calculated as follows:
Similarly, the operating profit of firm F is given by:
In the RR case, in addition to the profit from selling good D presented in the first term, firm D can grab a part of the profits generated from the consumption of good F by providing the repair services for good F . This is reflected in the second term of the first equation.
where the inequalities are due to a >a.
By using a >a and c > m H , we can confirm that 
Proof of Lemma 2
We have ∂{Π
The effect of a tariff on ΔΠ F Firm F 's gains from entry are given by
Besides that, we have
Hence, we can derive the unique cutoff level of a, a
We can easily confirm that ∂ a
is more likely to hold as c and t become smaller (resp. large) and m L becomes larger (resp. small).
Proof of Proposition 4
Let 
holds. Given firm D's action, firm F 's gains from entry is expressed as: 
Lastly, in the NR case, since ∂x NR F /∂t < 0 holds, we have ∂Π
Hence, ∂CS NR /∂t < 0 holds.
(ii) Firms' profits: In the RR case, we have 
holds under the parameterization, the equilibrium service regime becomes the NR case at t = t 0 and the RR case at t = t 1 . The changes in the amount of imports, consumer surplus, the profit of each firm, and world welfare are respectively given by x = −12.035 < 0.
As these numerical examples show, there exists a case where the tariff reduction reduces the imports, decreases consumer surplus and the profits of the foreign firm, increases the profits of the domestic firm, and worsens world welfare.
(ii) If a tariff reduction from
F increases the imports, consumer surplus, and the profits of firm F , and improves world welfare, we have the same effects
Next consider the case where K F = K 0 F does not hold. Suppose the case where the tariff reduction improves world welfare at t 1 ) , the post-liberalization regime is the OR case. By combining Propositions 2 and 4,
is necessary and sufficient so that the tariff reduction always increases the imports, consumer surplus, and the profits of firm F irrespective of the pre-liberalization service regime. Hence, we have K F = ΔΠ F (E, t 1 ) in this case.
Alternatively, suppose the tariff reduction worsens world welfare at K F = K 0 F . In this case, K F < ΔΠ F (E, t 1 ) is necessary but may not be sufficient for a welfare-improving tariff reduction. 
hold, the pre-liberalization regime is also the OR case so that the tariff reduction necessarily increases world welfare given that K F < ΔΠ F (E, t 1 ) holds.
In summary, when the tariff reduction worsens world welfare at K F = K 0 F , it is transformed to be welfare-improving (a) for all
As long as K D is small enough to satisfy K D < ΔΠ F (E, t) for all t, we can always find a unique
The equilibrium repairs in the presence of ISOs
In the monopoly-ISO case, the ISO's maximization problem at stage 3 coincides with that of firm D in the RR case. Hence, the first-order condition is given by (A1). Suppose λ > 0. This implies 
By the above equations and c ≥ m
With this property, by equation (A5), and c ≥ m H , we have:
This inequality contradicts
cannot hold in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since 
These maximization problems coincide with those in the NR subgame. Analytically, the repurchase of good F in this case and the extra purchase of good F in the NR subgame are identical.
Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes in the two cases become the same. 
The first-order conditions become: Since both the equilibrium sales and the equilibrium prices of the two goods become identical across the two cases, the equilibrium firms' profits, the equilibrium consumer surplus, and the equilibrium welfare in the presence of the repurchase coincide with those in the NR equilibrium.
Secondly, let us move on to the case where only a fraction of the broken units is replaced by the repurchased goods. In this case, the inverse demand for the repurchase is given by p F = qV F (x D , q(x F + x F )). Since V F F < 0 holds, the demand for the repurchase is decreasing in p F . Firm F 's maximization problem is written by:
And the first-order condition is given by:
In stage 2, the consumer maximizes V (x D , q(x F + x F )) + Z with respect to x D and x F , subject to Given the demand functions, the maximization problems of the two firms at stage 2 are written as:
By differentiating Π F with respect to x F and using (8), we have:
The last inequality is due to the properties that V F F < 0 and ∂ x F /∂x F > −1 hold. This means that the initial sales of good F must satisfy x F = 0, which contradicts the condition that
x F ≤ (1 − q)x F must hold. Therefore, this case cannot be the equilibrium outcome.
In sum, even if consumers have an option to replace the broken units of good F with the new units by repurchasing them from firm F who can resell the goods with a different price in the aftermarket, the equilibrium sales of the two goods, their equilibrium prices, and other equilibrium outcomes coincide with those in the NR equilibrium. Figure 1 : The valuation effect and the market-contraction effect 
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